Since the early days of the Cold War, early warning radars in Greenland have played a crucial role in defending North America against nuclear attacks by intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, critics have warned that these radars are vulnerable to attacks from hypersonic missiles, which U.S. bases in Greenland are ill-equipped to detect or intercept.
Troy Bouffard, director of the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience at the University of Alaska, highlighted that “the U.S. does not have a standing integrated air and missile defense shooter layer in Greenland today.” He emphasized that the threat posed by hypersonic cruise missiles necessitates a re-evaluation, as current defense systems are incapable of countering them.
In a recent essay for *Small Wars Journal*, Bouffard and co-authors advocated for a comprehensive air and missile defense system for Greenland, particularly focusing on Pituffik Space Base and its missile and space defense sensors. While Pituffik is secured by an Air Force Security Force squadron, these units primarily focus on ground defense against potential commando or terrorist raids rather than addressing hypersonic threats.
The authors suggest implementing a “layered air defense using short- and medium-range systems adapted to Arctic operations,” which would serve a distributed defense system across the North American Arctic. Proposed systems include Patriot batteries, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), and short-range air defense systems known as SHORAD.
To enhance detection and defense, a combination of sensors such as ballistic missile radars, air defense radars for low-altitude threats, and airborne early warning aircraft would be necessary. Additionally, the essay noted the potential inclusion of future Army-owned Layered Laser Defense (LLD) systems as tactical solutions to a strategic defense architecture.
Nevertheless, performing effective operations in the harsh Arctic environment, where temperatures can drop to nearly 100 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, poses significant challenges. The performance of radar and visual sensors can be adversely affected by ice, snow, and cold temperatures, although technology like adaptive optics and polarimetric radar may help mitigate these effects. Success in this unique theater will require specialized Arctic tactical warfare capabilities.
Greenland has been central to American early warning systems since the 1960 establishment of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). Now known as the Upgraded Early Warning Radar system, these sensors are operated by the 12th Space Warning Squadron, responsible for monitoring missile threats and tracking objects in space.
Defending Greenland also involves complex geopolitical issues since it is an autonomous territory of Denmark, despite being geographically part of North America. The Trump administration even suggested the possibility of purchasing Greenland, which did not sit well with Greenlanders or Danes.
Previously, Greenland fell under the jurisdiction of U.S. European Command until June 2023, when U.S. Northern Command assumed responsibility, reflecting its significance in U.S. homeland defense strategy. The Pentagon’s current Unified Command Plan now designates the North American Arctic to U.S. Northern Command and the European Arctic to U.S. European Command.
Close cooperation among multiple combatant commands is essential for effective defense, as proposed in the *Small Wars Journal* essay. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command could handle immediate air threats, while U.S. European Command could integrate Greenland within NATO’s regional defense plans. Furthermore, U.S. Strategic Command would ensure the defense of strategic assets and support overall deterrence and missile defense architecture.
The essay stressed the importance of aligning Greenland’s defense with NATO’s integrated air and missile defense plan, ensuring that defending the missile defense hub is part of a comprehensive Arctic campaign rather than an isolated effort. Finally, the authors argued for a renewed focus on Arctic readiness, emphasizing that effective defense relies not only on resources but also on patience and a deliberate strategy that prioritizes Arctic operations over previous post-Cold War neglect.
