An Air Force officer, Lt. Col. Phil Ferris, argues for the need for the Air Force to independently defend its own air bases, moving away from reliance on the U.S. Army for protection. In a recent essay for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Ferris highlighted that “the Air Force is doctrinally responsible for its own force protection.” Currently, the Air Force’s primary defense capability comes solely from its fighter aircraft, a situation he contends is inadequate for many scenarios.

Ferris emphasizes that many air bases, particularly overseas and in expeditionary contexts, lack on-site fighters. He notes that while the Air Force’s Security Forces utilize non-kinetic counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) options and some small arms, many units are under-equipped, lacking essential medium and heavy machine guns for effective protection. He suggests that Air Force bases should be responsible for defending against threats such as small drones and low-flying cruise missiles, while the Army manages high-altitude threats like ballistic missiles.

In his outlined strategy, Ferris states that the Air Force should handle counter-small unmanned aerial systems (C-sUAS) for drones weighing up to 1,320 pounds and address the defense gap against low and slow cruise missiles. Although the Army can provide advanced defense units like the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), he insists that the Air Force must maintain its own defense capabilities similarly to other military branches.

The stakes for this discussion are significant. If the U.S. were to engage in conflict with China, air bases like those in Guam are likely to face missile attacks, bombers, and ground raids. Citing examples such as Ukraine’s drone strikes against Russian air bases, Ferris illustrates how even small-scale threats can endanger valuable military assets.

The complexity of air base defense stems from differing responsibilities outlined in the 1948 Key West Agreement, which designates ground-based air defense as the Army’s responsibility, although Ferris claims that this distinction is partly misunderstood. A 1984 memorandum allows the Air Force to establish its point defense if Army funding falls short.

Ferris argues that the Air Force can no longer depend on the Army amidst its extensive global responsibilities. The Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment doctrine requires dispersing airpower across smaller installations, complicating the logistics and support of large air defense systems, like Patriot and THAAD missile networks.

To enhance air base defenses, Ferris advocates for a comprehensive plan that includes both active and passive measures. He suggests leveraging existing systems from the Army and Marine Corps, while also incorporating smaller, proven technologies like machine guns and shoulder-fired missiles for drone defense. Additionally, he recommends employing passive strategies such as camouflage and electronic warfare to enhance protection.

Management of these defenses should fall under the Security Forces Defense Force Commander, ensuring that the response to threats is cohesive and effective. Ferris also stresses the importance of emissions control, citing lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict, where signal transmission can attract attacks.

To counter ground-based threats from insurgents, terrorism, or guerrilla attacks, he recommends using technology for surveillance and remote observation, enabling greater situational awareness without necessitating significant manpower.

Ferris presents a sobering conclusion that some locations may be inherently indefensible, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. He suggests a shift in strategy, advocating for collaboration with allies and leveraging long-range capabilities instead of fortifying positions that may be too vulnerable to defend effectively.